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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PARO LE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 






Appearances: Scott A. Otis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 344 
Watertown, NY 13601 
Decision appealed: April 2019. decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of l S months. 
Board Member(s) Berliner, Drake 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received November 7'.2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
· Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Repo.rt, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: . 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to _ _ _ _ 
~firmed · Vacated remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ - ' . 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Reco~mendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons .for the Parole Board's determination !!!!!fil b e annexed.hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unies Findings and the separate findings of· 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed.to th~ Irunate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on tJ'?/Jc,ba,io 6f; . . . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole.File - Central File 
- P-2002(B) (1112018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Smith, Quintin DIN: 16-R-2629  
Facility: Cape Vincent CF AC No.:  05-122-19 B 
    
Findings: (Page 1 of 3) 
 
Appellant challenges the April 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 15-month hold. The instant offense involved a parole officer finding a loaded pistol located in 
Appellant’s bedroom. While incarcerated, Appellant was found in possession of a scalpel weapon. 
Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the determination was arbitrary and capricious because 
the Board failed to consider the required factors; 2) the Board is merely resentencing Appellant; 
3) the Board based its decision exclusively on the instant offense and Appellant’s criminal history; 
and 4) the Board failed to rebut the presumption of release created by the Earned Eligibility 
Certificate (“EEC”). These arguments are without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for 
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). In this case, Appellant received an 
EEC, therefore the deprecation standard does not apply here. 
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The 
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  In the absence 
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 
157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
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An EEC does not automatically entitle an inmate to discretionary release or eliminate 
consideration of the statutory factors including the instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York 
State Div. of Parole, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of 
Pearl v. New York State Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006).  Moreover, the 
Board is not required to give each factor equal weight.  Matter of Corley, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 
822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818; Matter of Pearl, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817.  The Board may 
deny release to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is 
released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release 
is not compatible with the welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo 
v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (2d Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 
176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 
N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the 
appropriate factors, including: the instant offense of Attempted Criminal Possession of a Weapon 
in the third degree, committed while on parole, and Promotion of Prison Contraband in the first 
degree; Appellant’s criminal history including a prior state term of incarceration for Robbery in 
the second degree; Appellant’s institutional efforts including a Tier III violation for the weapons 
charge and multiple Tier II violations, receipt of an EEC, IPA training, completion of ART and 
Phase I of Transitional Services, and enrollment in the college program; and release plans to live 
with his grandmother and work in construction. The Board also had before it and considered, 
among other things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, the sentencing minutes from the 
prison contraband conviction, and a letter from the District Attorney.  
 
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release 
would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its 
conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on both components of the instant offense that raise 
concerns about Appellant’s possession of weapons, that Appellant was on community supervision 
when a parole officer found the loaded pistol in Appellant’s bedroom, and the COMPAS 
instrument’s high risk score for felony violence. See Matter of Singh v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 1209, 
987 N.Y.S.2d 271 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Klein v. New York State Div. of Parole, 202 A.D.2d 
319, 319–20, 609 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (1st Dept. 1994); Matter of Byas v. Fischer, 120 A.D.3d 
1586-87, 1586, 992 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Thompson v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of 
Guzman v. Dennison, 32 A.D.3d 798, 799, 821 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (1st Dept. 2006); Matter of 
Espinal v. N.Y. State Bd. Of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019); Matter 
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of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Wade v. 
Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board acted within its discretion 
in determining these considerations rebutted any presumption created by the EEC and rendered 
discretionary release inappropriate at this time.  See generally Matter of Neal v. Stanford, 131 A.D.3d 
1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 342 (3d Dept. 2015).   
 
Inasmuch as Appellant contends the Board failed to consider requisite factors, there is a 
presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders.  See 
People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People 
ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d 
Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in 
fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).   
 
Finally, Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release merely resentenced him is without 
merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per 
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive Law 
§ 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 
(3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 
A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
